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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
CONTRARY TO THE PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT'S 
ASSERTIONS, THERE WAS NEVER A FINDING OF FACT 
IN THE LOR CASE THAT DEFENDANTS ACTED WITHIN 
A COMMON SCHEME OF FRAUDULENT CONDUCT 
In bringing its Motion for Summary Judgment and in seeking 
to uphold the trial court's granting of Summary Judgment, the 
plaintiff Chance Collar Company repeatedly states that the LOR 
jury found the defendant Samuel C. Thompson acted in concert with 
defendant Lane Murray and acquired both the LOR and the Chance 
drill collars through fraud. However, there is nothing in the 
LOR or Chance records to establish that the jury made any such 
finding of fact. Instead, the plaintiff seeks to rely on the 
jury instructions and the verdict form wherein the jury merely 
found that LOR was entitled to the LOR drill collars. No formal 
or express findings of fact were ever made by the jury, and the 
order and judgment on the verdict is also devoid of such 
findings. Instead, plaintiff Chance asserts as a fact that which 
can only be, at best, an inference. Using that inference as a 
fact upon which to base a summary judgment is blatant error. 
Because the summary judgment is based upon that fact, it should 
be reversed, and the matter remanded for trial on the issues. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT IS NOT PRECLUDED FROM RAISING AS AN 
ISSUE ON APPEAL THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE RECORD 
BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT 
The plaintiff Chance Collar Company cites the case of 
Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc., 758 P.2d 451 
(Utah App. 1988) for the proposition that the defendant Samuel 
Thompson cannot raise the issue of the insufficiency of the 
record for the first time on appeal. However, the Trimble case 
is readily distinguishable from this case, and instead, the 
applicable law is outlined by the Utah Supreme Court in Parrish 
v. Layton City Corp., 542 P.2d 1086 (Utah 1975). 
In Trimble, the plaintiff had originally brought suit to 
recover a real estate commission from an individual buyer, Leland 
Fitzgerald. Mr. Trimble was unsuccessful, and the trial court's 
decision was affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court in Trimble Real 
Estate v. Fitzgerald, 626 P.2d 453 (Utah 1981). Thereafter, 
Trimble brought suit against the seller, Monte Vista Ranch, 
seeking the same commission. The court granted the defendant's 
motion for summary judgment finding that Trimble was collaterally 
estopped from bringing the second suit, and the decision was 
based on the earlier Supreme Court opinion. On appeal, Trimble 
argued that the opinion, standing alone, was an insufficient 
basis to determine if the elements of the collateral estoppel 
test had been met. While the Court of Appeals tended to agree 
that the plain meaning of an appellate opinion might be at odds 
with the record and pleadings of a prior case, the court found 
that Trimble had limited his argument in opposition to summary 
judgment to how the appellate decision should be construed; and 
he did not argue its insufficiency. Therefore, he could not now 
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raise the issue on appeal. However, the Court of Appeals made it 
clear that the determination of whether or not Trimble could 
raise the issue on appeal was well within the Appellate Court's 
discretion. The court went on to conclude that, under the facts 
of the Trimble case, the court would not consider and take 
judicial notice of the prior record. 
Trimble does not preclude Samuel Thompson from raising on 
appeal the insufficiency of the record because it is easily 
distinguishable from this case. In Trimble the Court of Appeals 
concluded that, because the trial court did have the Supreme 
Court decision from which to determine the collateral estoppel 
issues, the record was sufficient to support summary judgment. 
In the case currently on appeal, the trial court had no 
documentation whatsoever before it from the LOR case, and 
therefore, it had nothing from which to determine the collateral 
estoppel issues. The plaintiff did not submit such documentation 
to the court until nine days after the applicable minute entry 
shows the Motion for Summary Judgment was granted. In addition, 
at no time was the defendant Samuel Thompson allowed to respond 
to the sufficiency of that documentation, due in part to the fact 
that the Summary Judgment had already been granted. (See Record 
pp. 178-211). Finally, as outlined above in Argument I, there is 
nothing in that submitted documentation or in the entire LOR 
record that the LOR jury actually made a finding of fact that 
defendant Samuel Thompson obtained the drill collars by fraud in 
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concert with Lane Murray. Instead, the plaintiff seeks to rely 
on an implication of such a finding from the jury instructions 
and the verdict form. 
Under these circumstances, it was error to grant plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, and the applicable rule of law was 
outlined by the Utah Supreme Court in Parrish v. Layton City 
Corp., 542 P.2d 1086 (Utah 1975). In Parrish, the Utah Supreme 
Court reversed the trial court's summary judgment based on 
collateral estoppel because the record of the prior action was 
not before the trial court and because the record of the action 
at issue contained substantial factual issues precluding such 
summary judgment. In reversing the trial court, the Utah Supreme 
Court stated: 
A survey of the record reveals that defendant 
never submitted a copy of the pleadings and 
judgment in [the prior proceeding] to the 
trial court, either in its pleadings or in 
company with its motion for summary judgment. 
The mere fact that there was a record of 
another action on file in the clerk's office 
did not place these records in evidence. 
Rule 68(1) and (3), U.R.E., and Rule 44(a) 
and (d), U.R.C.P., provide the methods by 
which a judicial record may be proved. Since 
the record of the prior action was not before 
the trial court, there is no basis to sustain 
the determination that plaintiff's claim was 
barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 
Id. at 1087. (Footnotes omitted). 
This statement of the law is directly applicable to this 
case. When the plaintiff filed its Motion for Summary Judgment, 
the plaintiff did not concurrently submit any pleadings or other 
4 
documentation from the LOR case. It was only after the Summary 
Judgment was granted that some documentation v/as submitted. Not 
only was that documentation insufficient to determine the 
collateral estoppel issues and completely devoid of any findings 
of fact as to a common fraudulent scheme of activity, defendant 
Samuel Thompson never had an opportunity to respond to its 
sufficiency. As a result, he cannot now be precluded from doing 
so. 
CONCLUSION 
It was error for the trial court to grant plaintiff's Motion 
for Summary Judgment based on collateral estoppel because there 
were material issues of fact precluding summary judgment, and the 
record in this matter was insufficient to determine whether the 
elements of the collateral estoppel test had been met. 
Respectfully submitted this l(r~^ day of January, 1989. 
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